Biological weapons have been used since antiquity, with documented cases dating back to the 6th century BC, when the Assyrians poisoned wells with ergots. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Japanese Army (Unit 731) experimented on prisoners of war in Manchuria with biological agents that are thought to have resulted in at least 10,000 deaths. Although in 1972 over 100 nations signed the Biological Weapons Convention, both the former Soviet Union and Iraq have admitted to the production of biological weapons, and many other countries are suspected of continuing their programs. Today, bioweapons are considered the cheapest and easiest weapons of mass destruction to produce.
The US government groups bioterrorism agents into three categories: A, B, and C. Category A includes organisms or toxins that pose the highest risk to the public and national security because they can be easily spread or transmitted from person to person; result in high death rates and have the potential for major public health impact; might cause public panic and social disruption; and require special action for public health preparedness. Category B agents are the second highest priority: they are moderately easy to spread; result in moderate illness rates and low death rates; and require specific enhancements of CDC's laboratory capacity and enhanced disease monitoring. Category C agents are the third highest priority and include emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass spread in the future because they are easily available; easily produced and spread; and have potential for high morbidity and mortality rates and major health impact. See http://emergency.cdc.gov/bioterrorism/overview.asp.
Category A agents (see the following text and Table II-60) include Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Yersinia pestis (plague), Clostridium botulinum toxin (botulism), Variola major (smallpox), and Francisella tularensis (tularemia), and viral hemorrhagic fevers. All these agents can be weaponized easily for aerial dispersion.
TABLE II-60. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS (SELECTED)Agent | Mode of Transmission | Latency Period | Clinical Effects |
---|---|---|---|
Anthrax | Spores can be inhaled or ingested or cross the skin. No person-to-person transmission, so patient isolation not required. Lethal dose estimated to be 2,500-50,000 spores. | Typically 1-7 days, but can be as long as 60 days | Inhaled: fever, malaise; dyspnea, nonproductive cough, hemorrhagic mediastinitis; shock. Ingested: nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, hematemesis or hematochezia, sepsis. Cutaneous: painless red macule or papule enlarging over days into ulcer, leading to eschar; adenopathy; untreated may lead to sepsis. Treatment: ciprofloxacin, other antibiotics (see text); anthrax vaccine, anthrax immunoglobulin. |
Plague | Inhalation of aerosolized bacteria or inoculation via flea bite or wound. Victims are contagious via respiratory droplets. Toxic dose 100-500 organisms. | 1-6 days | After aerosol attack, most victims would develop pulmonary form: malaise, high fever, chills, headache; nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain; dyspnea, pneumonia, respiratory failure; sepsis and multiple-organ failure. Black, necrotic skin lesions can result from hematogenous spread. Skin buboes otherwise unlikely unless bacteria inoculated through skin (eg, flea bite, wound). Treatment: tetracyclines, aminoglycosides, other antibiotics (see text); vaccine not available. |
Smallpox | Virus transmitted in clothing, on exposed skin, as aerosol. Victims most contagious from start of exanthem. Toxic dose 100-500 organisms. | 7-17 days | Fever, chills, malaise, headache, and vomiting, followed 2-3 days later by maculopapular rash starting on the face and oral mucosa and spreading to trunk and legs. Pustular vesicles are usually in the same stage of development (unlike those of chickenpox). Death in about 30% from generalized toxemia. Treatment: vaccinia vaccine, immune globulin (see text). |
Tularemia | Inhalation of aerosolized bacteria, ingestion, or inoculation via tick or mosquito bite. Skin and clothing contaminated. Person-to-person transmission not reported. Toxic dose 10-50 organisms if inhaled. | 3-5 days (range, 1-4 days) | Inhalation: fever, chills, sore throat, fatigue, myalgias, nonproductive cough, hilar lymphadenopathy, pneumonia with hemoptysis and respiratory failure. Skin: ulcer, painful regional adenopathy, fever, chills, headache, malaise. Treatment: doxycycline, aminoglycosides, fluoroquinolones (see text); investigational vaccine. |
Viral hemorrhagic fevers | Variety of routes, including insect or arthropod bites, handling contaminated tissues, and person-to-person transmission. | Variable (up to 2-3 weeks) | Ebola virus, Marburg virus, arenavirus, hantavirus, several others; severe multiple-system febrile illness with shock, delirium, seizures, coma, and diffuse bleeding into skin, internal organs, and body orifices. Treatment: Ebola vaccine for postexposure prophylaxis. Isolate victims, provide supportive care. |
Botulinum toxins | Toxin aerosolized or added to food or water. Exposed surfaces may be contaminated with toxin. Toxic dose 0.01 mcg/kg for inhalation and 70 mcg for ingestion. | Hours to a few days | See botulism. Symmetric, descending flaccid paralysis with initial bulbar palsies (ptosis, diplopia, dysarthria, dysphagia) progressing to diaphragmatic muscle weakness and respiratory arrest; dry mouth and blurred vision due to toxin blockade of muscarinic receptors. Toxin cannot penetrate intact skin but is absorbed across mucous membranes or wounds. Treatment: botulinum antitoxin. |
Ricin | Derived from castor bean (Ricinus communis); may be delivered as a powder or dissolved in water and may be inhaled, ingested, or injected. | Onset within 4-6 hours; death usually within 3-4 days | Nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, and diarrhea, often bloody. Not well absorbed orally. Severe toxicity, such as cardiovascular collapse, rhabdomyolysis, renal failure, and death, more likely after injection. Lethal dose by injection estimated to be 5-20 mcg/kg. Inhalation may cause congestion, wheezing, pneumonitis. |
Treatment: Supportive. Not contagious, no need to isolate victims. Prophylactic immunization with ricin toxoid and passive postexposure treatment with antiricin antibody have been reported in animals. | |||
Staphylococcal enterotoxin B | Enterotoxin produced by Staphylococcus aureus; may be inhaled or ingested. | Onset as early as 3-4 hours; duration, 3-4 days | Fever, chills, myalgia, cough, dyspnea, headache, nausea, vomiting; usual onset of symptoms 8-12 hours after exposure. Treatment: Supportive. Victims are not contagious, do not need isolation. Vaccine and immunotherapy effective in animals. |
T-2 mycotoxin | Yellow, sticky liquid aerosol or dust (alleged “yellow rain” in 1970s) is poorly soluble in water. | Minutes to hours | Highly toxic trichothecene toxin can cause burning skin discomfort; nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea, sometimes bloody; weakness, dizziness, and difficulty walking; chest pain and cough; gingival bleeding and hematemesis; hypotension; skin vesicles and bullae, ecchymosis, and necrosis. Eye exposure causes pain, tearing, redness. Leukopenia, granulocytopenia, and thrombocytopenia reported Treatment: Supportive. Rapid skin decontamination with copious water, soap; consider using military skin decontamination kit. |
The effect of a biological weapon on a population was demonstrated in an attack on the east coast of the United States in September 2001. Anthrax spores were delivered through the mail and resulted in 11 cases of inhalational anthrax and 12 cases of the cutaneous form of the disease. Even on that small scale, the effect on the public health system was enormous, and an estimated 32,000 people received prophylactic antibiotic therapy.
(See Table II-60 and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website on biological and chemical terrorism at http://emergency.cdc.gov/bioterrorism)
Recognition of a bioweapon attack most likely will be made retrospectively, based on epidemiologic investigations. Specific indicators might include patients presenting with exotic or nonendemic infections, clusters of a particular disease, and infected animals in the region where an outbreak is occurring. A historical example is the downwind pattern of disease and proximity of animal deaths that helped prove that the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk (in the former Soviet Union) in 1979 was caused by the release of anthrax spores from a biological weapons plant.
Contact the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 24-hour emergency operations center at 1-770-488-7100 for assistance with diagnosis and management.